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ABSTRACT: The present treatise tackles the phenomenon of boredom by first pro-
viding reasons for evading the dualistic approach to the phenomenon addressed. 
Based on the Cartesian criticism of the oversimplified dualist approach of neuro-
science, the paper delves into the phenomenological approach to the phenomenon 
of boredom, as could be only indirectly surmised from Husserl’s (basically Cartesian) 
transcendental phenomenology of time consciousness. The next chapter deals with 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology as implicated in his compelling and as of 
yet unsurpassed analysis of the phenomenon of boredom. Through approaching the 
phenomenon of boredom via Husserl and Heidegger, the basic discontinuity be-
tween Husserl’s transcendental and Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology comes 
clearly to the fore.
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I. Dualism and Boredom
Undeniably, boredom today is on the rise; and so are neuroscience and neuro-
philosophy – and with them the (easily avoidable, but ever-present) danger 
of the naturalistic reduction of reality. Neuroscientists have located, or bet-
ter, localized the problem by physiologically blaming it on the lack or de-
pletion of the chemical called dopamine. According to their findings, this 
chemical triggers a response in the human brain, emotionally self-reflected 
or recognized as the feeling of joy and excitement. It may of course be ar-
gued that “boredom-prone individuals may have a naturally lower level of 
dopamine, which then requires from these individuals a heightened sense of 
novelty – to get the dopamine flowing.”1 It may also be argued that indi-
1 Toohey (2011: 46). It should be noted here that Toohey is not a neuroscientist. His 
mention of scientific findings only serves as a springboard for arguing in favour of a more 
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viduals, not necessarily affected by naturally low dopamine levels, can suffer 
from boredom-like symptoms, caused by the boring, monotonous environ-
ment. We may rightly ask ourselves, however, is this all there is to it? The 
“it” meaning the human being, this most peculiar creature in all creation, 
the half-breed of angel and animal, in her unfathomable depth and com-
plexity. There are indeed more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of 
in neurophilosophy.
The underlying framework of these findings is the notorious Cartesian 
split between mind and body. We say “underlying” because what is at work 
in the arguments mentioned above is a further reduction of this monumental 
dualism to an entirely corporeal dualism of inner and outer reality, both rest-
ing on the substance of matter: genes and environment as inner and outer 
reality both belong to the corporeal reality.2
The reputation or notoriety of an author usually brings along the over-
simplified generalized view on the author’s basic conception. The one at work 
here, that of the split, relies on the following conclusion by Descartes in the 
sixth meditation of his famous Meditations on the First Philosophy:
And although possibly I possess a body with which I am very intimately con-
joined, yet because, on the one side, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself 
inasmuch I am only a thinking and unextendable thing, and as on the other, I 
possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthink-
ing thing, it is certain that this I is entirely and absolutely distinct from my 
body, and can exist without it. (Descartes 1993: 91)
In this case, Descartes’ dualism can be easily challenged with a more 
careful reading of his Meditations, the very source of the infamous dualism.3 
Cogito as the thinking thing and its thoughts, cogitations, is a complex phe-
nomenality, with its specific “thoughts” divided
into certain kinds […] Of my thoughts some are, so to speak, images of the 
things, and to these alone is the title “idea” properly applied; […] But other 
philosophical approach, as does ours. Still, we would like to voice sharp disagreement over the 
following resentment (2011: 6): “Existential boredom seems more of an impressive intellectual 
formulation than an actual emotion.”
2 It is by no means our intention here to push neuroscientific research findings aside as 
entirely irrelevant. Rather, and far more importantly, it is of crucial importance what one does 
with these findings. The relevance of the neurobiological or neuropsychological research can 
be readily established for example in the field of psychotherapy, both practically and theoreti-
cally, as in the case of Margaret Wilkinson (2006, 2010), Jungian analyst, who has written 
two compelling books on the subject, emphasizing the valuable contribution of contemporary 
neuroscience to both understanding the mind-brain relationship as well as recognizing its 
valuable contribution to clinical practice. 
3 This is usually so with every compelling philosopher, who first of all evinces elusiveness 
– meaning liveliness – of thought, irreducible to one basic tenet.
109J. M. LOZAR: Boredom with Husserl and Beyond
thoughts possess other forms as well. For example in willing, fearing, approv-
ing, denying, though I always perceive something as the subject of the action 
of my mind, yet by this action I always add something else to the idea which I 
have of that thing; and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or 
affections, and other judgements.
Now as to what concerns ideas, if we consider them only in themselves and 
do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves, they cannot properly 
speaking be false. (1993: 60)
Without even approaching the controversial topic of the famously un-
scientific theory of the pineal gland,4 the passage clearly shows that there is 
a certain relatedness in cogito, which places the thinking thing in the very 
midst between the two seemingly (1993: 91) “entirely and absolutely” dis-
tinct substances.
Judgements can be either true or false exactly in that they reach beyond 
the thinking thing, into outer reality; and the same can be said of affections. 
What is of crucial importance here is that in Descartes, affections as cogita-
tions are manners of fulfilment of the thinking thing, epistemologically trou-
blesome as they may be, the modes of comportment of the Cogito to itself 
and outer world. Affection is the result of the affectedness of the Cogito by a 
thing from outer world. The Cogito lets itself be affected by external things. 
This letting-be is the ability of an affective encounter with things. And this 
“subjective” fulfilment of affectedness by affecting things is a specific, basic 
mode of intentionality. Judgement, volition and affection contain more than 
ideas in the proper sense (as nothing but images of things) and this “more” of 
affectivity should be understood as the Cogito’s capacity of letting be moved 
by the world.5
With this said, we have provisionally addressed some troublesome as-
pects of the dualistic approach to the subject matter chosen. The reason for it 
is obvious: the neurobiological (psychological) or environmental (sociologi-
cal) approach fail to address the essence of boredom in that they reduce it to, 
and blame it on a context (physical process or reality) exterior to its proper 
truth. In order to come closer to boredom, or address its “interiority”, we 
need to distance ourselves from the dualistic approach, and enter the field of 
transcendental philosophy.
4 “I further notice that the mind does not receive the impressions from all parts of the 
body immediately, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one of its smallest parts, to 
wit, from that in which the common sense is said to reside […].” (1993: 97) In The Passions 
of the Soul, Descartes speaks of les esprits animaux, animal (or better animated) spirits, which 
are situated in a small (pineal) gland as the seat of the soul, are extended, yet so tiny that they 
already belong to the spiritual substance.
5 See Coriando (2002).
110 Prolegomena 13 (1) 2014
II. Transcendental Turn and Boredom
Husserl, to be sure, never tackled the issue of boredom. Yet, we might in-
directly reveal the essence of boredom exactly by explicating its temporal 
essence. In other words, Husserl’s conceptual framework, employed in his 
analyses on time, proves fruitful for determining the peculiar nature of bore-
dom.
Performing phenomenological reduction leaves the meditating subject 
with the evidence of subjective, experiential flow of cogitations or intentional 
content and leaves the question of the existence of outer objectivity bracketed 
our or undecided. If, according to Husserl, every intentional act has such a 
content, which can be articulated independently of how the act is actually 
related to the transcendent world, then the situational and neurobiological 
causes for boredom are bracketed out from any judgement, and cannot serve 
any purpose in the phenomenological, i.e. transcendental articulation of the 
phenomenon.
Can Edmund Husserl, Heidegger’s teacher, who was rightfully re-
proached by his famous student for the misleading absolutization of theo-
retical comportment, serve here as an appropriate starting point for entering 
the realm of what appears to be highly evasive and unfit for either noetic 
or noematic description? Indeed he can. Edmund Husserl enjoys a well-de-
served reputation for being the leading authority on the philosophical analy-
sis of the phenomenon or concept of time consciousness. His analyses on 
the temporality of consciousness remain a complex and highly topical issue, 
which is obviously evinced by an outburst of interpretations coming from 
the contemporary phenomenological community. The present paper has no 
intention of coming to grips with this hardly manageable production of texts, 
whose primary concern is to elucidate Husserl’s own interpretations in their 
developmental aspect.6 Instead, it wishes to initiate a train of thought, which 
is in this respect, as well as in the phenomenological community of today, 
rarer, although clearly anticipated by Husserl himself, who in Cartesian Medi-
tations, at the end of the Second Meditation, says that “an enormous task is 
foreshadowed, which is that of transcendental phenomenology as a whole: 
the task of carrying out of all phenomenological investigations within the 
unity of a systematic and all-embracing order” (1982: 54). By making use of 
his conceptual apparatus on time consciousness, the paper wishes to address 
6 In recent years, phenomenological research on Husserl’s analyses of time has mush-
roomed all over the world, the reason for it being Husserl’s originality and power of insight 
as well as the publication of his later manuscripts on the nature of time. See Husserl (2001), 
(2005). See also E. Husserl and R. Bernet, Texte Zur Phänomenologie Des Inneren Zeitbewusst-
seins (1893–1917); R. Bernet, “Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in Husserls 
Bernauer Manuskripten”, in Hüni & Trawny (2002). See also Lohmar & Yamaguchi (2010).
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a specific phenomenon left unaddressed by the father of phenomenology: the 
phenomenon of boredom.
Two basic notions of his phenomenology of time, despite its indisput-
able complexity, are those of Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung, ren-
dered in English as original presentation and presentification or non-original 
presentation.7 Husserl’s perhaps most original insight can be attributed to his 
analysis of the temporal dimension of original presentation, which rests on 
the present moment or the now of sense perception.8 Consider for example 
the following passage from his On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of 
Internal Time:
That all reality lies in the indivisible now-point, that in phenomenology eve-
rything ought to be reduced to this point, these are sheer fictions and lead to 
absurdities. In phenomenology we don’t have to do with objective time but with 
the data of adequate perception. This requires us to consider perceptions, with 
their appearing now, past, and future, as given. (1991: 174)
Husserl here most seriously, as well as convincingly, challenges the (widely 
accepted) mathematical conception of time, which is understood as succes-
sion of time points. Contrary to mathematical “belief ”, “the now is as little a 
fictitious mathematical time point as the ‘previous tone’, as the first or second 
tone before the now or after it. Each now rather has its perceptible extension, 
which is something that can be confirmed” (1991, 172). This temporal field 
of the now is a peculiar phenomenality, which can be “philosophically read” 
from (rather than into, as done by mathematicians) the actual perceptual 
experience, in this case perceiving a melody.
One may well wonder why devote attention to Husserl’s analysis of the 
perceptual level of consciousness, presentation, which evinces an extended-
ness of the now (primal impression) retentionally into the immediate past 
(the no longer now) and, protentionally, into immediate future (the not yet 
now)? In this context, is there actually anything Husserl can contribute to the 
understanding of the phenomenon of boredom, which can be considered as 
something which altogether evades and escapes the original temporal field of 
the now?
On the level of perceptual experience there belongs to the intentional es-
sence of time consciousness a tripartite unity of primal impression, retention 
(or primary memory) and protention (primary expectation). Without going 
into too much detail here, we could claim that this is the so-called spontane-
7 See Cairns (1973: 59 and 123). We could, for the sake of clarity, also speak of presenta-
tion and representation.
8 One should not forget that Husserl devotes a great deal of attention to perception, and 
his views have been highly influential. Compare, for example, Merleau-Ponty (2002).
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ous living present, which is to be distinguished from the level of non-origi-
nary presentation or re-presentation (or reproduction), which demands the 
faculty of active recollection (or secondary memory) and expectation. If the 
former belongs to the experiential realm of spontaneity, where consciousness 
can only passively (presently) experience the shading-off of the perceived ob-
ject into the past, the latter introduces the realm of freedom: “A priori the re-
presentation of an experience lies within the domain of my freedom” (1991, 
44). Or better still:
The original appearing and the flowing away of the running-off modes in the 
appearing is something fixed, something of which we are conscious through 
“affection” at which we can only look (if we happen to achieve the spontaneity 
of looking). Re-presenting, on the other hand, is something free, a free run-
ning through: We can carry out the re-presentation “more quickly” or “more 
slowly”, more distinctly and explicitly or more confusedly, in a single lightning-
like stroke or in articulated steps, and so on. (1991, 49–50)
What about boredom? In boredom, time seems to drag to a halt; there 
is nothing worthy of noticing here. To put it in Husserl’s terms, there appears 
to be no temporal flow or process of continual sinking in time; furthermore, 
there is nothing specially worthy of remembering, and nothing generating ex-
pectations, be they heightened or diminished, since everything is and remains 
the same. In boredom, we experience the unbearable state of being stuck in 
this all-the-sameness. Surprisingly, the last two sentences reveal the temporal 
truth of being bored. To put it succinctly, what happens in boredom is the 
collapse of presentation into representation. Better still, original, or primal, 
consciousness, which is thrown into the living, attention-gripping present, 
fails to be affected by anything streaming forth in the temporal flow, and is 
devoured and completely overwhelmed by reproductive consciousness.
What exactly does this mean? And what does this all-the-same-ness of 
reproductive consciousness bring along that it consumes the living present? 
Actually, there are two collapses taking place here, and the collapse of the now 
is the consequence of another, more crucial collapse: the future and past, be-
longing to the reproductive consciousness rather than primal consciousness, 
collapse into each other. The secondary expectation becomes the secondary 
memory. What we expect to happen (coming from the future), has already 
happened (sunk into the past). The future is the past. And if what is about to 
happen, has always already happened, then the now itself, with its peculiarly 
extended temporal field, shrinks and fades away, too. If nothing new lurks 
on the horizon of the future, then protention as the primary expectation 
becomes one with the secondary expectation, which “claims and knows in 
advance” that what it is about to encounter is equal to what it has already 
witnessed. And if nothing new sinks into immediate past, then consciousness 
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fails to be gripped by the adumbration of the primal impression sinking in 
time, and there is nothing there to be retained as memorable. Representation 
prevails over presentation, exactly because the past becomes the future and 
the future always, in advance, presents (or better represents) the past.
Through the more or less skilful appropriation of Husserl’s conceptual 
framework, we have grasped the (temporal) eidos of one of the primary traits 
of boredom: indifference.9 The re-appropriation of Husserl’s phenomenology 
of time enables us to see a more compelling and richer meaning of boredom 
as indifference, or surrender to uninterest. There is no difference between the 
future and the past, between the now and the always, whence profound lack 
of interest on the side of the consciousness. A passage from Husserl’s time 
book, of course indirectly and unintentionally, corroborates what we have 
just said:
The consciousness of time is therefore an objectivating consciousness. Without 
identification and differentiation, without the positing of the now, the positing 
of the past, the positing of the future, etc. [there would be] no enduring, no rest-
ing and changing, no being in succession and so on. That is to say: Without all 
of this, the absolute “content” remains blind, does not signify objective being, 
duration, etc. And here too belongs the distinction between presentation and 
re-presentation. Something exists in objective time. Something! (1991: 308)
We say unintentionally because Husserl never seriously tackled the trou-
blesome issue at hand.10 Still, “without […] differentiation” strongly implies 
that without differentiation there is no difference, due to which conscious-
ness, sunk into indifference, “remains blind” to “enduring, resting and chang-
ing, being in succession”.
The comparison with Jean-Luc Marion’s analysis of boredom in his God 
without Being could not be more suitable and rewarding here (especially in 
view of his explicit mention of Husserl’s notion of retention), with the only 
difference that in Marion’s text blindness is replaced with deafness – and, sur-
prisingly, all the more appropriate for Husserl’s detailed analysis and extensive 
use of the example of the perception of the melody:
For boredom […] remains deaf, even to what it hears. If there is no greater 
deafness than in the one who does not want to hear, then no deaf person hears 
less than boredom. What it hears it gives no attention to, no intention, no 
retention. Its characteristic function indeed consists in provoking indifference 
to every provocation, especially to a strong provocation, especially to essential 
invocation. Boredom suspends the claim, and above all that of Being, because 
 9 Indifference is rendered in Slovenian as “ravnodušnost”, which means literally “flatness 
(sl. “raven”) of the soul (sl. “duša”). Interestingly, it corresponds to the English adjective “flat”, 
which means dull, unexciting and uninteresting.
10 On this see Biceaga (2006).
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it has no function or definition other than this very suspension. (Marion 1991: 
117)
If Husserl adamantly claims that the intentional structure of conscious-
ness is an essence belonging (universally) to each and every individual sub-
ject, the peculiar nature of boredom reveals that there remains an experiential 
field for consciousness, which evinces a definitive collapse of intentionality, 
and thereby proves his universal claim wrong.
This is why we are now obliged to move a step forward from Husserl’s 
phenomenology, which – of course rewardingly – resulted in a compelling 
insight into the temporal (and thereby essential) truth of the phenomenon 
of boredom.
III. Boredom and Heidegger
What does this moving beyond the transcendental approach imply? So far we 
have endeavoured to show that the truth of boredom cannot be fruitfully re-
vealed by simply unearthing factors external to its nature. Instead, we offered 
a transcendental phenomenological approach, which presupposes a bracket-
ing out of all external (objective) reality and calls for a step back to the thing 
itself, i.e. for a detailed eidetic description of subjective experience itself. This, 
however, has lead us astray from the factical life experience and catapulted 
us into phenomenological attitude (as opposed to natural attitude), which 
seems to acquire an ahistorical, non-temporal perspective.
It is high time now to move to hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger. 
In other words, the blind spot in Husserl’s universal eidos (essence) of inten-
tionality proves to be the non-universal, irreducibly human quality which be-
longs to the finitude of time and history. And this is one of Heidegger’s major 
and bitter reproaches to the philosophy of transcendental idealism, namely 
that it fails to bespeak the individuality in its rootedness in time and history 
as well as facticity of life.11 With this, Heidegger’s phenomenology decidedly 
moves away from Husserl’s phenomenology. And this is perhaps most clearly 
visible in his famous (and as of yet unsurpassed) treatise on boredom.
At the very beginning of part 1, paragraph 16 (1995: 95), Heidegger 
adamantly claims that in order to bespeak the attunement of boredom, this 
requires an awakening of the attunement rather than ascertaining it as some-
thing at hand (Gr. vorhanden, rendered as present-at-hand) and continues 
even more decisively:
11 See Heidegger (2001: 174): “Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of 
something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of Dasein’s being – one which has been taken 
up into existence.”
115J. M. LOZAR: Boredom with Husserl and Beyond
We can see already that any so-called objective ascertaining of a fundamental 
attunement is a dubious, indeed impossible undertaking. Accordingly, it is also 
meaningless to ask in general about the pervasiveness and universality of at-
tunement or to brood over the universal validity of something ascertained in 
this way. (1995: 60)
The eidetic evidence as the temporal essence of boredom, which we 
derived from Husserl’s phenomenological approach, could very well be the 
primary target of Heidegger’s criticism here. The essence of boredom, ob-
jectively ascertained and laying claim on universality, obviously leads astray 
from the truth of boredom. Any eidos which is present-at-hand for the medi-
tating subject, according to Heidegger, loses sight of boredom exactly in that 
it fails to awaken – boredom. Through obtaining possession12 of objective, 
present-at-hand evidence, we actually manage to but escape boredom, we let 
it fall asleep rather than become possessed by it. What we are required to do 
is assume the “methodological directive for the interpretation of becoming 
bored: avoiding the approach of an analysis of consciousness, and maintain-
ing the immediacy of everyday Dasein” (1995, 88).13
It is the need to awaken boredom rather than setting it out as an object 
of thought that presupposes our surrendering to it or letting ourselves be 
possessed by it. In no other way can we, says Heidegger, come any nearer 
its basic truth. And the need to awaken boredom clearly implies Heidegger’s 
method of approaching this evasive phenomenality. As the chapter titles 2, 
3 and 4 from Part 1 patently show, the sequence of three forms of boredom 
under scrutiny is highly telling: Heidegger advances from the first form of 
boredom, (1995: 78) “Becoming Bored by Something”, through the second 
form, (1995: 106) “Being Bored with Something” and ends with the final, 
fundamental, deepest form, (1995: 132) “Profound Boredom as ‘It Is Boring 
for One’”.
The first, most superficial form of boredom, which describes the most 
common, everyday experience of the tedious waiting for a train at a remote 
train station and constantly looking at the watch, seems to bring us back to 
what we have previously managed to bracket out; namely the world out there: 
the desolate train station is what causes us to be bored. But this, of course, 
only seems so. The world for Heidegger – this is one of his “precious inherit-
ances” from Husserl – is not an entirety of things out there, from without 
12 We hereby hint at the original meaning of the Greek word ousia, essence, which bears 
the meaning of possession.
13 Heidegger, in the need to distance himself from Husserl, and not only Husserl, no 
longer uses the concept of the subject; instead, he uses the concept Dasein as being-there. If he 
does employ the notion of subject, he does it only for the purpose of severe criticism. For the 
difference between the two, see M. Heidegger, Being and Time, Division One.
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the subject as that which is “within itself ”. Rather, Dasein is, as he time and 
again reiterates, always already being-in-the-word. The latter, as an existen-
tiale, forms the basic mode of existence of Dasein. This explains, as well as 
excuses, the awkward use of hyphens. It only seems that Heidegger explains 
boredom from out of boring things, because he clearly states that boredom 
comes neither solely from without, as caused by boring objects, nor solely 
from within, as transferred from us on the objects: “These characteristics [the 
boringness] are on the one hand objective ones, taken from the objects them-
selves, from out of them, yet at the same time subjective ones, and according 
to the common explanation transferred from subjects onto objects” (1995, 
85). And because it neither comes from objects nor is transferred to them, 
and is obviously a tertium datur, the traditional categories of cause-effect and 
transference fail to grasp the peculiar nature of boredom.
And yet, still, he begins with things which bore us; with the most com-
mon, superficial form of boredom, experienced in most ordinary, everyday 
situations. The fundamental shift underlying this moving away from his 
teacher’s phenomenological approach (of first reducing the entirety to the 
subjective flux) is his distancing from the primacy of the theoretical comport-
ment, which is done, as many a contemporary scholar readily admits,14 with 
the help of Aristotle. Heidegger’s attention to everyday, or pre-philosophical, 
comportment of Dasein, from which he advances to the self-understanding 
of philosophy, his (phenomenological) hermeneutics of facticity, is a “logical” 
consequence of his affirmation of the primacy of non-theoretical, i.e. practi-
cal comportments.15 The second crucial aspect, as implicit it might be in the 
book on boredom, for drawing a more or less sharp distinction between the 
two phenomenologists, is Heidegger’s persistence on the fundamentality of 
attunement or mood, already expressed in his magnum opus:
A mood assails us. It comes neither from “outside” nor from “inside”, but arises 
out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being. But with the negative dis-
tinction between state-of-mind and the reflective apprehending of something 
“within”, we have thus reached a positive insight into their character as disclo-
sure. The mood has always already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a 
whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something. (2001, 
176)16
The three forms of boredom coincide with the tripartite (2001: 169) 
“unitary primordial structure of Dasein’s being”: being-in-the-world. To be 
able to see this more clearly, we should first explicate the existentiale to its 
fullness: being-in-the-world is Dasein’s-being-in-the-world-of-things. The 
14 On this see Volpi (1984); Kisiel (1995); Brogan (2005).
15 On this see Heidegger (2001).
16 One cannot fail noticing how totally un- and counter-Husserlian this sounds!
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first form of boredom, the most ordinary, everyday form of boredom, being 
bored by something, coincides with the third element of being-in-the-world: 
being bored by (things of ) the world. The second form, as ordinary as the 
first one, coincides with the first element of the existential structure: Dasein 
as being bored with, for example, a party. With it, as boredom “moves” from 
things to Dasein, we are already witnessing a certain deepening, or better, 
broadening of boredom:
In becoming bored by something [first form – J. L.] we are precisely still held 
fast by that which is boring, we do not yet let it go. […] In being bored with 
[second form – J. L.] … the boredom is no longer nailed fast to something, but 
is already beginning to diffuse. Boredom has then not arisen from this particular 
thing, on the contrary it radiates out over and beyond particular boring things. 
[…] It settles over several things: everything becomes boring. (1995: 92)
And the last, third form of boredom, which for Heidegger implies the 
most fundamental truth of boredom, profound boredom, coincides with the 
central element, the very “being-in” of Dasein’s existence. So far, by establish-
ing the difference between the first two forms of boredom, “we have also 
already indicated the direction in which boredom becomes more profound” 
(1995: 133).
What we need to do now to proceed in the more proper manner (proper 
to the essence of boredom) is, as with the help of Husserl in the previous 
chapter, to press forward to the essence of time. Time in the first two forms of 
boredom should be considered in the sense of passing the time which comes 
as a nuisance. By passing the time in being bored by or with something, 
we try to escape boredom and “time becoming drawn out, becoming long” 
(1995: 78). Profound boredom, however, betrays its overpowering nature in 
that it no longer permits us to even attempt to pass the drawn out or long 
time.17 What are then the basic traits of profound boredom, which reveal 
themselves in their overpowering moment? Two structural moments which 
most readily fit profound boredom are those of being left empty and being 
held in limbo.18 With these two notions we can at the very first instant see 
what Heidegger means by saying that the attunement of boredom should be 
awakened, or that we should let it be awake. Both of them namely bespeak 
as well as arouse the feeling, or more appropriately, attunement of emptiness 
and being caught in an unsolvable situation. What exactly happens in this 
situation we find ourselves (unwillingly) in? Heidegger says poignantly: we 
are stuck in being left empty because Dasein is delivered over to the entirety 
of beings, in which Dasein experiences beings as a whole in their refusal (1995: 
17 “Passing the long time” as escaping this time, if we consider the German notion of 
boredom, Langeweile, long time or long while, actually coincides with “escaping boredom”.
18 English renderings of Heidegger’s concepts of Leergelassenheit and Hingehaltenheit.
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137). This self-refusal of beings is understood as their indifference. And Da-
sein itself is no exception here, since it, as a being, belongs to the entirety 
of beings: “Beings have become indifferent as a whole, and we ourselves as 
these people are not excepted. […] We find ourselves in the midst of be-
ings as a whole, i.e. in the whole of this indifference” (1995: 138). And this 
indifference is the essential truth of being left empty, which means that, in 
this attunement, beings in their entirety do not disappear; rather, they “show 
themselves precisely as such in their indifference” (1995: 138).
The second structural moment constituting the essence of profound 
boredom is that of being held in limbo. What does this being left in the lurch 
imply? Heidegger says: “Simultaneously something else shows itself: there 
occurs the dawning of the possibilities that Dasein could have, but which 
are left unexploited precisely in this ‘it is boring for one’, and as unexploited 
leave us in the lurch” (1995: 141). Thus, ultimately, being left empty (where 
beings in their indifference fail to address us) structurally corresponds to be-
ing left in limbo (the situation points to the possibilities unavoidably left 
unexploited).
How could we then relate this troublesome issue to time? “There is noth-
ing to be found here of time. Just as in general this third form of boredom 
has nothing of an explicit time-relatedness in itself. […] One is rather almost 
tempted to say that in this ‘it is boring for one’ one feels timeless, one feels 
removed from the flow of time” (1995: 141).
Here we have come full circle; or better, back to what we have ourselves 
managed to ascertain with the help of Husserl’s phenomenological approach. 
But, to put it in a nutshell, this circle has closed only seemingly. For not only 
do the two approaches differ in that the former first brackets out the factical 
everyday situation in which we are usually thrown in boredom, and tries to 
grasp the universally applicable essence of boredom, freed from factual exist-
ence; and that the latter fully embraces the everydayness of existence in order 
to be able to penetrate to a deeper level of the superficially the same. The dif-
ference, despite the palpably similar temporal truth of boredom, also consists 
in the result. If the former approach seeks to acquire possession of the eidos or 
essence of boredom as something present-at-hand in order to be able to grasp 
reality and at the same time step beyond it, over the natural rootedness in being 
and non-being, and into the transcendental realm of absolute freedom (as well 
as immortality); the latter endeavours to awaken the attunement so that the 
result, profound boredom, awakened from sleep, is deliberately desired as the 
necessary prerequisite for stepping out of boredom as the entrancement with 
temporality as such, which “impels Dasein into the moment of vision as the 
properly authentic possibility of its existence” (1995: 153). In other words, 
boredom in its essence is not at all freely repeatable and representable (in 
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Husserlian fashion); it is, rather, that into which we are thrown and always 
already permeated with, because being thrown into boredom means being 
entranced by the horizon of temporality as such.
With this, the phenomenological “story” of boredom – with these two 
differences between the two phenomenological approaches, which have been 
more or less successfully unearthed in talking the phenomenon of boredom 
– comes to a close. The richness of both phenomenologies, that of Hus-
serl and Heidegger, namely prevents us to delve into further issues, which 
exceed the framework of the present treatise not only in its subject matter, 
but also, and primarily, in its extent. It is, however, quite possible to at least 
hint at the possible direction of further broadening the horizon of the dif-
ference between the two authors. What Heidegger seeks to achieve with his 
analysis of boredom (however impalpable this might seem to be) is to think 
the entire history of philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, Husserl being no 
exception here, as the history of metaphysics, which, as he poignantly says 
in his European Nihilism, is none other than the history of growing nihilism. 
And what else is his profound boredom than the diagnosis of the final stage 
of the European human condition, in which the highest ideals of Socratic 
philosophy, together with beings in their entirety, start to withdraw, suspend 
themselves, reveal themselves in their indifference, in their nothingness, ni-
hil.19 In Heidegger’s poignant words:
Have things ultimately gone so far with us that a profound boredom draws back 
and forth like a silent fog in the abysses of Dasein? (1995: 80)
IV. Conclusion
Initially, we tried to dismantle the insufficient and misleading truth of bore-
dom as exemplified by neuroscientific approach. It turns out that this vein 
of thought rests too heavily of the one-sided understanding of Descartes. 
The one-sidedness and improperness of the approach can be demonstrated 
with Descartes himself, as well as with a more appropriate approach found 
in the Cartesian, transcendental thinker Husserl, seen as the founder of phe-
nomenology. By employing his phenomenological method of reduction, and 
eidetic description, we have attained a phenomenological insight into the 
essence of boredom, which can be compellingly articulated in unearthing 
19 In this respect, and crucially related to Husserl’s absolute consciousness, which could 
be understood as intimately related to genuine boredom, see Biceaga (2006). Another useful 
aspect related to boredom opens up if the eschatological concept of the progress in history is 
compared to the phenomenological understanding of the history of Being. In this case “the ar-
rival at the end is actually a return to the beginning. There is no progress. There is no redemp-
tion, no fusion of existence and meaning.” See Svetlič (2011: 517).
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its temporal sense. Yet, this approach, whose ambition is to reach the uni-
versal truth, fails exactly in that the truth of boredom evinces a definitive 
collapse of intentionality, and thereby proves its universal claim wrong. The 
collapse of the universal therefore calls for a return to the individuality of 
factical existence, which is one of the excelling traits of the phenomenology 
of Heidegger. This is the reason why his insights gained into the essence 
of boredom through hermeneutic phenomenology of facticity have revealed 
an even more proper essence of boredom. At the same time, the discussion 
of the same specific phenomenon has more or less successfully pointed at 
crucial differences between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology.
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